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Privately-owned forests in the Pacific Northwest (PNW) are important potential carbon sinks and play a large
role in carbon sequestration and storage. Non-industrial private forest (NIPF) owners constitute a substantial
portion of overall forest landownership in productive regions of the PNW; however, little is known about their
preferences for non-market incentive programs aimed at increased carbon storage and sequestration, specifically
by limiting timber harvest, and how those preferences might impact the outcome of forest carbon programs. We
simulated landscape-scale outcomes of hypothetical forest carbon incentive programs in western Oregon (USA)
by combining empirical models of NIPF owners' participation with spatially explicit forest carbon storage and
sequestration data. We surveyed landowners to determine their willingness to enroll in various hypothetical
forest management incentive programs that varied in terms of harvest restrictions, contract length, annual
payment and incentive payment amounts, and cost-share percentages, as well as the program framing (e.g.,
carbon versus forest health). We used multinomial logistic regression to model whether landowners might enroll
based on program attributes, landowners' attitudes toward climate change and forest management, past and
planned future forest harvest activities, and socio-demographics. We found that 36% of respondents stated that
they would probably or definitely enroll in at least one of the hypothetical programs they were shown while 21%
of respondents refused all programs that they were offered. Our final model of landowner willingness to enroll
indicated that higher annual and higher cost-share payments were the strongest positive predictors of whether
landowners would enroll vs. not enroll. Landowners' willingness to enroll was not influenced by program framing
as either a “forest carbon” or a “forest health”; however, landowner attitudes toward climate change were the
next strongest positive predictor of enrollment after annual and cost-share payments. By simulating landowner
enrollment in six policy relevant program scenarios, we illustrate that carefully designed forest carbon incentive
programs for NIPF owners could have tangible carbon protection benefits (16.25 to 50.31 MMT CO2e cumu
lative) at relatively low costs per MT CO2e ($3.60 to $7.70). We highlight tradeoffs between maximizing
enrollment in forest carbon incentive programs and providing longer term protection of carbon. This research
contributes to the literature on the design of potential forest carbon incentive programs and communication
about forest carbon management, as well as aims to aid policy makers and program administrators that seek ways
to engage private landowners in carbon-oriented forest management.

1. Introduction
Natural climate solutions, i.e., conservation, restoration, and
improved management of ecosystems that increases carbon sequestra
tion and storage in the biosphere, are one way to achieve a portion of the

emissions reductions needed if we are to meet global targets limiting
global average temperature rise to 2 ◦ C or less (Griscom et al., 2017). In
global, national, and regional studies, forest-based carbon sequestration
consistently ranks among the most effective natural climate solutions
(Cameron et al., 2017; Fargione et al., 2018; Graves et al., 2020; Griscom
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et al., 2017; IPCC, 2018; Le Quéré et al., 2009). To realize the potential
benefit from additional carbon storage and sequestration in forests,
forest carbon management activities need to be implemented soon
(Griscom et al., 2017) and will require participation and support from
landowners of forests where carbon can be sequestered and stored. In
the United States, non-industrial private forests (NIPF) comprise 39% of
all forestland in the United States (Butler et al., 2021) and forest man
agement decisions by NIPF owners (e.g., whether and when to harvest
trees, whether to convert forests to an alternate land uses) have
important consequences for terrestrial carbon sinks (Christensen et al.,
2019).
A wide range of policy instruments could incentivize carbon
sequestration and storage in NIPF. Policies aimed at affecting forest
management among NIPF owners are generally classified as educa
tional, technical assistance, financial, and regulatory (Kilgore et al.,
2007; Schneider and Ingram, 1990) and current strategies, proposed and
in practice, include carbon taxes (Li et al., 2021; van Kooten et al.,
1995), carbon subsidies (Kim et al., 2008; Mason and Plantinga, 2013),
combined tax-subsidy programs (van Kooten et al., 1995), carbon rental
systems (Sohngen and Mendelsohn, 2003), as well as direct incentive
programs and carbon offset markets (Charnley et al., 2010). Voluntary
incentive programs that provide compensation to NIPF owners either
based on adoption of practices aimed at forest carbon management (e.g.,
payment for practice) or based on the amount of carbon sequestered (e.
g., payment for performance) may prove to be a valuable and effective
tool in NIPF (Charnley et al., 2010; Langpap and Kim, 2010). These are
differentiated from potential market-based instruments which
encourage carbon sequestration through the sale of offset credits
(Charnley et al., 2010; Markowski-Lindsay et al., 2011; Thompson and
Hansen, 2012; van Kooten, 2018). Practice-based incentive programs
may provide a policy option that balances risk and return on investment
while reducing the monitoring burden on program administrators and
NIPF owners (Wise et al., 2019). Despite the potential for practice-based
incentive programs to appeal to a broad range of NIPF owners, most
studies have focused on carbon offset programs and there has been
minimal work assessing NIPF willingness to participate in carbonoriented forest management under direct practice-based incentive pro
grams. The practice-based incentive programs presented in this study
include common components of technical assistance program (e.g.,
management plans, cost-share) as well as financial incentives (e.g.,
payments based on enrollment) targeted to shift NIPF owner behavior
toward maintaining existing in-forest carbon stores and increasing forest
carbon sequestration.
In this study, we assess NIPF owners' willingness to participate in
hypothetical practice-based incentive programs in the Pacific Northwest
region of the United States. Wet forests of the coastal Pacific Northwest
are some of the most naturally carbon-rich forests in the world but,
primarily due to current and legacy impacts of forest harvesting, current
carbon storage volumes are much less than their ecological potential
(Smithwick et al., 2002). Older forests store significantly more carbon
than younger forests (Janisch and Harmon, 2002; Smith et al., 2006) and
deferring timber harvest or lengthening timber harvest rotations to
encourage the development of older forests has been highlighted as a
potential forest management practice that could result in substantial
carbon benefits (Stephenson et al., 2014). Deferred timber harvest can
be achieved through multiple mechanisms ranging from lengthening
harvest cycles or changing harvest strategies to partial harvest and
increased retention of both living and dead biomass (Diaz et al., 2018;
Diaz et al., 2009; Harmon et al., 2009; Janisch and Harmon, 2002). In
addition to reducing the near-term carbon emissions, deferring timber
harvest can result in long-term increases to in-forest carbon stocks and
more diverse forest structure (Christensen et al., 2019; Gray et al., 2016;
Harmon et al., 2009; Law et al., 2018; Luyssaert et al., 2008; Oliver
et al., 2014; Stephenson et al., 2014) while simultaneously enhancing
wildlife habitat, improving soil and water quality, and conserving
biodiversity (Franklin et al., 2018; Frey et al., 2016; Segura et al., 2020).

Below, we briefly review studies of NIPF owner willingness to partici
pate in carbon markets alongside literature related to NIPF owner
engagement with incentives programs. This review serves to motivate
the selection of program attributes evaluated in our study as well as
inform our hypotheses related to NIPF owner willingness to enroll in
hypothetical practice-based incentive programs aimed at timber harvest
deferral in the Pacific Northwest.
Estimates of NIPF owner participation rates in carbon offset markets
vary widely and depend on several variables related both to carbon
offset program design and NIPF owner characteristics. Generally, NIPF
owners are deterred from participating in carbon markets due to limited
or uncertain revenues from carbon, early withdrawal penalties, and long
contract lengths as well as stringent management plan requirements and
high costs and resources associated with project implementation and
accounting (Charnley et al., 2010; Dickinson et al., 2012; Fletcher et al.,
2009; Khanal et al., 2019; Khanal et al., 2017; Markowski-Lindsay et al.,
2011; Miller et al., 2012; Wise et al., 2019). Financial revenue from
carbon markets can be complicated for NIPF owners to predict, as it can
range widely depending on current carbon stocking, property charac
teristics, as well as variable carbon prices and fluctuating demand for
carbon offsets, all of which deters NIPF owners due to decreased
financial viability and increased price risk (Kerchner and Keeton, 2015).
NIPF owners have reported limited familiarity with carbon offset mar
kets which may lead to lower willingness to enroll (Fletcher et al., 2009;
Galik et al., 2013; Kilgore et al., 2007; Markowski-Lindsay et al., 2011).
However, this relationship was not true among NIPF owners in the Lake
States (USA) where modeled participation in carbon offset programs was
high (40–60%) despite most people being unfamiliar with carbon mar
kets (Miller et al., 2012) nor among NIPF owners in California, where
approximately 60% had knowledge of the carbon markets but only 20%
said that they were likely to enroll in carbon markets (Kelly et al., 2015).
Dickinson et al. (2010, 2012) found that only 5% of NIPF owners gave
high ratings to various carbon market scenarios due to low expected
revenues, extensive time commitments, early withdrawal penalties, and
antipathy toward required management plants. Similarly, MarkowskiLindsay et al. (2011) found very low participation rates (less than 10%)
in carbon offset market scenarios that closely resembled current market
options (e.g., the California Climate Action Reserve and Voluntary
Carbon Standard) and found that NIPF owners preferred greater net
revenue, no withdrawal penalty, and shorter contracts with no addi
tionality requirement.
In studies of carbon market feasibility and NIPF owners, carbon
market program attributes like revenue and contract length are consis
tently found to be strong predictors of NIPF owner willingness to
participate (Kelly et al., 2015; Khanal et al., 2017; Soto et al., 2016;
White et al., 2018). However, NIPF owner attitudes toward climate
change, non-timber management objectives, risk tolerance, and finan
cial motivations are often important modulating factors (Kelly et al.,
2015; Miller et al., 2012; White et al., 2018). NIPF owners who are
concerned about climate change place less importance on revenue and
withdrawal penalties in carbon offset markets than those not concerned
about climate change (White et al., 2018) and may require lower pay
ments to participate (Miller et al., 2012). NIPF owners who express
skepticism about climate change are less likely to enroll in carbon
markets (Kelly et al., 2015), whereas those that believe forests/trees are
“good for climate change” may be more likely to participate in carbon
market programs (Markowski-Lindsay et al., 2011). Many NIPF owners
do not have timber production as a primary goal and may have multiple
land management objectives (Alig, 2003). NIPF owners with non-timber
management goals may be more likely to participate in carbon market
programs (, Kelly et al., 2015; Markowski-Lindsay et al., 2011; Miller
et al., 2012) perhaps because many of the strategies that lead to
increased carbon sequestration might also enhance non-timber benefits
from their forests or because they do not perceive a direct tradeoff be
tween income generation from timber harvest and carbon sequestration.
Similar to participation in carbon markets, participation by NIPF
2

R.A. Graves et al.

Forest Policy and Economics 141 (2022) 102778

owners in practice-based incentive programs is negatively influenced by
contract lengths and positively influenced by cost share and initial
upfront payment amounts (Mitani and Lindhjem, 2021). As compensa
tion increases in incentive programs, participation among NIPF owners
also increases and one-time up-front payments may be more effective for
increasing participation than annual payments (Mitani and Lindhjem,
2021). NIPF owner participation in practice-based incentive programs is
positively related to non-timber management goals and these owners
might be willing to participate at lower incentive payment rates. In a
study focused on western Oregon and Washington, NIPF owners moti
vated by objectives other than timber production could be enlisted into
incentive programs aimed at delaying timber harvest for 10 years in the
interest of improving riparian habitat at a lower cost than NIPF owners
with mainly timber objectives (Kline et al., 2000). Similarly, Khanal
et al. (2017), while highlighting that carbon sequestration incentive
programs should aim to be at least revenue-neutral, found that NIPF
owners with recreational management goals and other non-timber
management goals would be likely to participate at lower revenue
levels. Incentive programs that highlight technical and management
planning assistance, cost sharing, and direct contact with a forester
consistently have been found to positively influence participation by
NIPF owners (Daniels et al., 2010; Langpap and Kim, 2010). Similarly,
lack of awareness of incentives and lack of understanding of how a
particular incentive program would apply to them and their land man
agement can drive lower participation among NIPF owners (Langpap
and Kim, 2010).
Understanding the factors that influence participation decisions by
NIPF owners is a critical to designing successful and well-received
incentive programs (Langpap, 2006). Furthermore, program design
can, by influencing participation rate, influence the eventual outcome
and performance of forest carbon incentive programs at landscape scales
(Amacher et al., 2003). For example, programs that include longer
contracts may negatively influence participation rates which may lead
to reduced program outcomes across the region as compared to a shorter
contract with higher participation rates (Shah and Ando, 2016). Out
comes of incentive programs aimed at modifying forest management
practices can be evaluated at landscape scales using landscape simula
tion models (Conway and Lathrop, 2005; Lewis and Plantinga, 2007).
Landscape simulations draw inspiration from landscape ecology
(Gardner et al., 1987; Peterson et al., 2003) and have been used
extensively to assess a range of consequences from land-use policy and
corresponding land-use change (Diebel et al., 2008; Gibon et al., 2010;
Janssen et al., 2005; Wallin et al., 1994). In the simplest form, landscape
simulation models allocate an expected proportion of landscape change
(i.e., land use/land cover transitions) based on some set of rules (Borah
et al., 2018; Castellazzi et al., 2010; Gibon et al., 2010; Van Dessel et al.,
2008). Landscape simulation models have been used to evaluate the
potential outcomes of incentive programs aimed at private landowner
conservation behaviors (Bell et al., 2019; Pattanayak et al., 2004; Smith
et al., 2016; Spies et al., 2007) as well as to evaluate potential land use
and forest management response to carbon offset markets and market
conditions (Borah et al., 2018; Cho et al., 2018; Latta et al., 2016).
However, to our knowledge, the use of landscape simulations to assess
the outcome of forest carbon incentive programs remains rare in the
forest policy and climate policy literature (but see Cho et al., 2019).
We examine differences among NIPF owner willingness to partici
pate in incentive programs aimed at increasing carbon storage and
sequestration based on program attributes and variables related to NIPF
owners that are consistently found important in the literature. We hy
pothesized that NIPF owners' willingness to enroll in incentive programs
would be positively related to incentive payments and cost share and
negatively related to contract length and more restrictions on timber
harvest. We also hypothesized that willingness to enroll would be higher
if programs were framed as “forest health” initiatives as opposed to
“forest carbon” initiatives. We expected willingness to enroll to be
negatively related to future harvest plans, current forest productivity,

and the importance that NIPF owners placed on investment-related
goals, but positively related to NIPF owners' concern about climate
change and the importance they placed on amenity-related goals. Given
published research on NIPF owners, we expected that owners with larger
acreages would be likely to have different harvest and management
practices than owners with smaller acreages (Butler et al., 2016; Lang
pap and Kim, 2010) and that NIPF ownership size would affect will
ingness to participate. We further expected that willingness to enroll
would be influenced by NIPF owners' age (− ), education (+), and in
come (+). We conducted a survey using best-worst choice (BWC) to
characterize the influence of program attributes and NIPF owner vari
ables on NIPF owners' willingness to enroll in hypothetical forest carbon
incentive programs. BWC is a hybrid method which allows for esti
mating NIPF owner willingness to enroll in a program as a whole but
also to assess NIPF owner preference for specific incentive program
attributes.
We combined modeled willingness to enroll from survey data with
landscape simulations and spatially explicit data on forest carbon to
evaluate the outcomes of hypothetical practice-based incentive pro
grams. By extending our study from willingness to participate at the
program level to landscape-scale carbon storage and sequestration
benefits, we provide policy makers with the ability to compare projected
participation rates under different programs with program costs, po
tential carbon benefit, and compare the relative cost ($ per MT CO2e) of
these incentive program scenarios.
2. Methods
2.1. Study area
Our study area encompassed 16.3 million acres of forestland in
western Oregon (Fig. 1), of which NIPF comprise 18%. We focus on NIPF
owners with between 50 and 5000 acres of forest (20.2–2023.4 ha), who
collectively own 60% of the NIPF in our study area. The study area
comprises four major ecoregions (i.e., Coast Range, Western Cascades,
Willamette Valley, and Klamath Mountains) which are characterized by
a marine-influenced climate with high rainfall (Thorson et al., 2003).
There is substantial variation in forest productivity (Mg C ha− 1 yr−,
Latta et al., 2009) on NIPF land within and among ecoregions in the
study area (Fig. 2) and the four ecoregions vary in terms of dominant
forest types, historical fire regimes, and current land use. The forests in
the Coast Range are predominantly highly productive coniferous forests
historically characterized by historically infrequent, high severity fire
regimes (Rollins and Frame, 2006) (Table A.1). Similarly, forests of the
Western Cascades are almost entirely coniferous with dominant species
varying by elevation and site history, and the majority (70%) histori
cally characterized by infrequent, mixed to high severity fire regimes
and the remainder characterized by historically frequent, low to mixed
severity fire regimes (Table A.1). The Willamette Valley, characterized
by mild, wet winters and warm, dry summer, is dominated by agricul
tural land use. The forests of the Willamette Valley are varied; remnant
oak woodland and savannahs are common forest types throughout the
valley while coniferous forests dominate the foothills of the Coast Range
on the west and the Western Cascades to the east. The variation in forest
types is reflected in the historical fire regime, with most of the Will
amette Valley forests characterized by frequent, low severity fires and
the remainder characterized by infrequent, mixed to high severity fires
(Table A.1). The Klamath Mountains ecoregion contains steep climatic
and biophysical gradients and the forests vary from highly productive,
mesic conifer forests in the western portion of the ecoregion to less
productive, drier conifer forests in the interior and eastern portion of the
ecoregion. The forests of the Klamath Mountains are predominantly
characterized by very frequent to frequent, low to mixed severity fire
regimes (Table A.1). Given the differences in productivity, land use, and
historical fire regimes, we expected there to be differences in NIPF
management and owner responses among ecoregions and stratified our
3
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Fig. 1. Study area includes 16.3 million acres of forestland in western Oregon, shown here overlaid with ecoregion boundaries.

Fig. 2. Forest productivity (Latta et al., 2009) on non-industrial private forest ownerships varies across ownerships and ecoregions in western Oregon.

sampling design accordingly.

Dickinson et al., 2012). Because we expected differences in response
across ownership size and ecoregion, we stratified our sample by
ownership size (50–500 acres, 50–5000 acres) and ecoregion (Table A.2)
and used stratified random sampling to select 1500 NIPF owners from
the initial list of over 10,500.
We used a mail-survey questionnaire to collect information from
NIPF owners about their forest land, forest management history and
goals, attitudes toward climate change and forest management, as well
as information about themselves (i.e. socio-demography). The bulk of
the questionnaire elicited NIPF owners' preferences for incentive pro
grams through a BWC task, described in more detail below. We pretested the final survey instrument using cognitive interviews and

2.2. Survey design and data collection
We constructed the survey sample frame based on property parcel
maps and information provided by state and municipal agencies. We
focused on individuals who own between 50 and 5000 acres of forest
land, as determined by intersecting parcel data with 2000–2017 forest
cover data (Hansen et al., 2013). The 50-acre cutoff excluded NIPF
owners whose forest land holdings were unlikely to be considered for
timber harvest and where the economies of scale make forest manage
ment activities less likely (Alhassan et al., 2019; Charnley et al., 2010;
4
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Enhancement Program (CREP)) to inform our program attributes.
Given the number of variables in Table 1, there were 243 possible
hypothetical incentive programs that include each attribute once with
one specific level of the attribute. We used an orthogonal main effects
plan (OMEP; Street et al., 2005) to keep the survey reasonable length.
We created 18 hypothetical program profiles by varying the five pro
gram attributes, each with three levels, and including a blocking vari
able to create three survey versions with six profiles in each. Each
respondent was randomly assigned to a survey block and, in addition,
each person was randomly assigned to receive programs framed as
“Forest Carbon” or “Forest Health” (Fig. A.1). All programs required that
NIPF owners have a forest management plan written by a professional
forester, sign a contract, and have a forester verify compliance regularly
through the program length. All programs included an early withdrawal
penalty equal to any incentive payments received and NIPF owners
could choose to enroll only a portion of their forested land in the pro
gram. Fig. 3 shows an example of a full program profile. For each hy
pothetical incentive program, respondents were asked to choose the best
feature and worst feature and, considering the program as whole,
whether they would be willing to enroll in it or not and how many acres
they would be likely to enroll.

informal review (n = 10). We deployed the mailing starting in July 2020
using a modified Dillman tailored design method (Dillman et al., 2014).
Respondents had the option to complete the survey and mail it back to
us, or to complete the survey online using a web address and passcode
included in the mailing.
We used best-worst choice (BWC) to assess NIPF owner preferences
for incentive program attributes. BWC is a hybrid method grounded in
utility theory that combines best-worst scaling (BWS) (e.g., Finn and
Louviere, 1992; Soto et al., 2016) and full-profile conjoint (Louviere
et al., 2015; Luyssaert et al., 2008). BWC has recently been applied to
understanding NIPF owner preferences for carbon market programs (see
Soto et al., 2016; White et al., 2018) and allows researchers to compare
the NIPF owners' preferences across all program attributes and attribute
levels, estimated as their relative utility, as well as estimate the impact of
program attribute levels on the eventual outcome measure, i.e.,
‘accepting’ or ‘rejecting’ an incentive program. In our survey, programs
were presented as best-worst choice profiles where respondents first
chose a ‘best’ and ‘worst’ attribute from the listed program features (i.e.,
BWS task) and then stated whether they would enroll in the program if it
were available to them using a 5-point scale (definitely yes, probably
yes, unsure/maybe, probably not, definitely not) (i.e., full-profile
conjoint, Louviere et al., 2008, 2015).
Our study aimed to assess NIPF owner willingness to enroll in
practice-based incentive programs aimed at deferring timber harvest on
a portion of their forestland over the program period and thus maintain
forest carbon storage and continued sequestration on their forestland.
We designed hypothetical forest carbon incentive programs by varying
five key attributes: the initial signing payment, the fixed annual pay
ment per acre enrolled, the cost share for forest management plan
preparation, the contract length, and the stringency of harvest limita
tions (i.e., change in management required by the program) (Table 1).
We developed our list of program attributes and levels of each attributes
through a literature review of NIPF owner willingness to participate in
forest carbon management in other regions, including both in carbon
markets and incentive program, and practice-based incentive programs.
We also reviewed several current and proposed forest carbon and
incentive programs for NIPF owners (e.g., the Family Forest Carbon
Program, a partnership between The Nature Conservancy and the
American Forest Foundation and the USDA Conservation Reserve

2.3. Data analysis
We extracted socio-demographic data from survey responses
including age, education, gender, income, and political tendency. To
characterize respondents' timber harvest plans, we extracted both their
response to whether they had harvested timber for sale in the past 10
years (yes/no) and whether they had current plans to harvest timber for
personal use or for sale in the next 10 years (yes/no). Forest ownership
characteristics included the acres of forest land owned as reported by the
respondent. In addition, we overlaid the parcel data with spatially
explicit data on aboveground biomass (Hudak et al., 2020) and calcu
lated the average carbon storage (CO2e per ha) attributed to each re
spondents' forest ownership. NIPF owner management goals were
measured using a five-point importance scale across 12 items adapted
from the National Woodland Owners Survey (Table A.3). NIPF owner
attitudes toward forest management and sociocultural values were
measured using a five-point agreement scale across 8 items adapted

Table 1
Program attributes and attribute levels used to create hypothetical program profiles according to an orthogonal main effects plan (OMEP) which included a blocking
variable.
Program
attribute

Attribute description

Attribute level descriptions

Initial Signing
Payment
Fixed Annual
Payment
Cost share

One-time amount earned upon
enrollment
Amount earned for each year of
enrollment in the program
Percent of costs covered related to
forest management plan preparation
and implementation

No signing incentive

$10 per acre

$20 per acre

$15 per acre per year

$25 per acre per year

$50 per acre per year

No cost share

Pays up to 50% of technical assistance for
management plan preparation and costs of
management activities

Pays up to 75% of technical
assistance for management
plan preparation and costs of
management activities

Time commitment of contract

10 years

20 years

30 years

Management

Change in management required by
program

No commercial timber harvest; thinning
and partial harvest allowed for limited
personal use. Personal use harvests,
including deadwood removals, must be
reported and allowable volumes are
specified by your management plan.

No timber harvest for
duration of contract. Any
deadwood removal must be
reported.

Block

Blocks were included in the
orthogonal main effects design to
allow create a design with 6 profiles
per survey and still maintain OMEP.

Thinning and partial harvest permitted,
for personal or commercial purposes, but
can not exceed the permitted harvest level.
Harvest levels can not exceed the
estimated 5-year growth volume for your
forest and are specified by your
management plan. All harvest, including
deadwood removals, must be reported
each year.
Survey Block A

Survey Block B

Survey Block C

Contract
length

5
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Fig. 3. Example of a BWC program profile included in the survey. Each respondent was asked to evaluate six program profiles.

from Schaaf et al. (2006) and Larson (2010)(Table A.4). Finally, NIPF
owner attitudes toward climate change were measured using a fivepoint agreement scale across 4 items adapted from Markowski-Lindsay
et al. (2011) (Table A.5). We used principal components analysis (PCA)
to collapse these multidimensional data into composite indices
describing NIPF owner management goals, NIPF owner attitudes toward
land management, and NIPF owner attitudes toward climate change.
Reliability of all indices was tested using Cronbach's alpha and we
checked for correlation among indices. If indices were highly correlated,
we retained the index with a higher Cronbach's alpha for further anal
ysis. For retained indices, we calculated respondents' index score as their
mean response across the items included in each index.
We conducted a series of analyses to (1) use the BWC approach to
assess NIPF owners' preferences for program attributes (BWS) and
analyze the impact of program design and NIPF owner characteristics,
forest management goals/plans, and attitudes on NIPF owner willing
ness to participate, (2) predict the proportional enrollment of NIPF
owners across all possible programs, and (3) assess the landscape-scale
carbon benefits and other outcomes related to a suite of policyrelevant program designs. All analyses were conducted using R
version 4.0.2 (R Core Team, 2021).

mean utility (Flynn et al., 2007). We used effects coding wherein one
attribute level, from each attribute, is not explicitly included in the
model but embedded in the other levels of the attribute. Each omitted
effects coded attribute level can be recovered as the negative sum of the
other level-scale variables. In BWS analyses, the attribute with the
lowest impact on utility is typically omitted to be used as the “reference
case” (Flynn et al., 2007; Louviere et al., 2015). This reference case takes
on a value of zero on the latent scale of utility. Models were fit using the
conditional logit function (clogit) within the survival R package (Ther
neau, 2021).
We measured NIPF owners' intent to enroll in a hypothetical incen
tive program using a five-item Likert scale, which we transformed into 3
nominal categories: Not Enroll (definitely not, probably not), Might
Enroll (maybe/unsure), and Would Enroll (probably yes, definitely yes).
We used a mixed-effects multinomial logistic regression model to eval
uate the factors that influence NIPF owners' willingness to enroll in a
forest carbon incentive program. Mixed-effects multinomial logistic
regression is a generalization of logistic regression that allows for more
than binary responses while incorporating a random effects term
(Agresti, 2002). In these models, suppose that a response with categories
j = 1 …. q is observed for individual i = 1… n. Multinomial logistic
regression estimates pij, the probability that the response for an indi
vidual i is equal to j, relative to and the j = 1, i.e., the reference category
(Elff, 2021). We set the reference category to “not enroll”. Thus, our
model provides insight into the factors that drive NIPF owners to
consider or accept programs as opposed to rejecting them. Models were
fit using maximum likelihood estimation using the baseline-category
logit function (mblogit) within the mclogit R package (Elff, 2021). We
specified a full model which included variables hypothesized to influ
ence NIPF owner decisions including all program attributes, NIPF owner
socio-demographic characteristics, past and planned future harvest ac
tivity, attitude indices, and forest ownership characteristics (Table 2).
We included a random intercept for each participant to account for
multiple observations from each individual. We used backward stepwise
selection based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC) to reduce the
full model (Burnham and Anderson, 2002). We evaluated model fit using
McFadden's pseudo R2 (McFadden, 1974) and posterior predictive
checks and report the correct classification rate (CCR) and the Kappa
statistic (Cohen, 1968). We report the coefficient estimates and standard
errors from the final model. Because coefficients from the multinomial

2.3.1. Program attribute preference and willingness to participate
Each record in the survey data set corresponds to a respondent who
provided answers to multiple survey questions, and, in some cases, item
non-response led to missing responses to the BWC scenarios. For analysis
of NIPF owner preference for program attributes and the factors that
influence NIPF owner willingness to enroll in practice-based incentive
programs for forest carbon, we used data from respondents who
completed at least half (3 out of 6) of the BWC profiles they received. We
tested for differences between respondents who completed at least half
of the BWC profiles and partial respondents (i.e., those that did not
complete the BWC task) using Kruskal-Wallis and Chi-square tests.
We used paired conditional logit models to analyze the BWS data
from our survey respondents. This analysis uses the random utility
framework (RUF) and allows us to assess how often one program attri
bute is preferred over another and to determine attribute and attribute
level-scale impact values (Finn and Louviere, 1992; Flynn et al., 2007).
Impact values represent the mean utility across all levels of an attribute,
where the specific attribute level values represent the deviation from the
6
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Table 2
Characteristics of NIPF owners who responded to our mail survey (n = 307) and those who data were included on the BWC regression analysis (completed at least 3 out
of 6 program scenario evaluations (n = 180). Values are summarized as the median (interquartile range) for numeric variables and % of respondents in each category
for categorical or ordinal variables. Binary variables are displayed as the % within the non-reference category (1). Test statistics comparing characteristics those who
completed the BWC task to those who did not (complete vs. partial respondents) are shown.
Variable group

Variable description

Survey respondents (n =
307)

Regression analysis (n =
180)

Partial vs. complete
respondents

Respondent Sociodemographics

Age (years)
Income (ordinal)

69 (61–76)
18.8%
17.7%
19.9%
16.6%
26.9%
72.2%

65 (58–73)
14.2%
16.3%
19.5%
18.4%
31.5%
72.1%

H = 27.02, p < 0.001
H = 3.80, p = 0.07

45.2%

46.2%

H = 0.18, p = 0.67

47.6%

48.9%

H = 0.44, p = 0.51

4 (3.25–4.75)
3.67 (3–4)
3.33 (2.33–4)

4 (3.25–5)
3.67 (3–4)
3.33 (2.33–4)

H = 4.36, p = 0.04
H = 0.78, p = 0.38
H = 1.61, p = 0.21

4.0 (3–4.33)

3.67 (3–4.33)

H = 1.72, p = 0.19

4.0 (3.67–4.67)

4.0 (3.67–4.67)

H = 0.66, p = 0.42

4.33 (4–5)
3.33 (2.67–4.0)

4.3 (4–5)
3.67 (3.0–4.0)

H = 0.80, p = 0.37
H = 7.29, p < 0.01

109 (69–251)
280.1 (197.2–375.6)
27.5%
28.9%
10.5%
33.1%
8.2%
17.9%
23.7%
24.0%
26.2%

110 (77–200)
276.3 (203.4–377.1)
29.4%
27.8%
10.6%
31.7%
8.3%
20.0%
24.4%
22.2%
20.0%

H = 2.66, p = 0.10
H = 0.06, p = 0.8
X2 = 1.02, p = 0.8

Harvest plans

Landowner attitudes

Forest ownership
characteristics

Political Tendency

Less than $50,000
$50,000 - $74,999
$75,000 - $99,999
$100,000 - $149,999
$150,000 or greater
Education (binary: 1 = college degree, 0 = no college
degree)
Harvested timber for sale in past 10 years (binary: 1 = Yes,
0 = No)
Plans to harvest in the next 10 years (binary: 1 = Yes, 0 =
No)
Climate change attitudes (mean composite index score)
Landowner management
Amenity goals (index score)
goals
Investment goals (index
score)
Home-related goals (index
score)
Forest management
Active management (index
values
score)
Protection (index score)
Societal benefit (index
score)
Area owned (acres)
Mean carbon storage (CO2e/ha)
Ecoregion
Coast Range
Klamath Mountains
Western Cascades
Willamette Valley
Very liberal
Somewhat liberal
Moderate
Somewhat conservative
Very conservative

H = 16.4, p < 0.001

X2 = 7.85, p = 0.10

proportion of NIPF owners willing to enroll in a forest carbon incentive
program is the same as the proportion expected from our empirical
survey data. We used Monte Carlo simulations to account for uncertainty
associated with NIPF owner enrollment.
We developed a simulation dataset by extracting parcel boundaries
for all privately owned forestland less than 5000 acres within our study
area. Based on owner names, we merged multi-parcel ownerships into a
multipart polygon for analysis. We assume all ownerships are available
to participate in hypothetical incentive programs; the resulting simula
tion landscape consists of ~10,500 NIPF owners. For each ownership,
we calculated the total forest area owned (acres) by overlaying the
parcel boundaries with forest cover data (Hansen et al., 2013). We
extracted mean aboveground biomass from published lidar-based
aboveground biomass maps (Mg C ha− 1, Hudak et al., 2020) and
mean carbon sequestration (Mg CO2e ha− 1 yr− 1) from imputed maps of
forest productivity based on Forest Inventory Analysis data (Latta et al.,
2009). Above-ground biomass values were converted to carbon dioxide
equivalents (CO2e) per hectare following guidelines established in the
IPCC Good Practice Guidance for Land Use, Land-Use Change and
Forestry (Penman et al., 2003), which assumes carbon content to be 50%
of the above-ground biomass of each living tree (Smith et al., 2006).
For each program scenario, we used the predicted proportional
enrollment to assign NIPF owners as “enroll vs. not enroll”. Specifically,
we randomly assigned NIPF owners as willing to enroll until we met the
expected proportional enrollment for each program. We assumed that
NIPF owners enrolled only a portion of their forest land, consistent with
the data from survey respondents. In each simulation, for each land
owner, we assigned a proportion of forest enrolled drawing from a
truncated normal distribution ranging with mean = 0.51 and sd = 0.39

logistic regression model cannot be directly interpreted as marginal ef
fects, we present the odds ratio for each variable, which can be inter
preted as the effect of a one-unit change in the variable on the
probability that a NIPF owner would enroll or might enroll in a program.
2.3.2. Predicting enrollment
We used the final model to predict the likelihood of each of the
survey respondents (n = 307) to enroll or consider enrolling across a full
factorial of possible program design (243 possible programs). From
these, we calculated the likely proportion of NIPF owners who would
enroll or consider enrolling in each hypothetical program (i.e., # pre
dicted to enroll/307). From the full factorial of program designs, we
selected a suite of six policy-relevant program designs with the goals to:
1) maximize enrollment regardless of required management or contract
length, 2) maximize enrollment but require longer contracts (i.e., 20 and
30 years), and 3) maximize enrollment in programs that require no
timber harvest (i.e., most restrictive forest management) and 10-, 20-,
and 30-year contracts. See Table 4 for the resulting policy-relevant
program designs.
2.3.3. Landscape simulations of program outcomes
We estimated landscape-scale outcomes for each policy-relevant
program scenario using Monte Carlo simulations which combine the
predicted participation (i.e., the proportion of NIPF owners who would
enroll vs. not enroll) with NIPF owner parcel data and spatially explicit
carbon storage and sequestration data. We focus our landscape simula
tions on predicted enrollment (i.e., NIPF owners who would enroll
versus not enroll) and do not include the NIPF owners who would only
consider enrollment. We assume that, at the landscape scale, the
7
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calculated from empirical survey data. We repeated this process for 500
iterations.
For each iteration of NIPF owner enrollment in each program sce
nario, we calculated the total forest area enrolled (acres), total current
carbon storage (MMT CO2e), and total annual carbon sequestration
(MMT CO2e yr− 1) by summing across all enrolled ownerships. We
calculated total program costs by summing the incentive and cost-share
payments made to individuals under each program scenario based on
the enrolled area. We based likely cost-share on allowable cost share
amounts for forest management plans by enrolled acreage size under the
Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) EQIP CAP-106 from
2019. Our calculated program cost only includes payments made to
NIPF owners as incentive or cost share and does not include any
administrative costs.
For each scenario, we report the mean and standard deviation for
enrolled area, initial carbon storage, annual sequestration, and program
costs from the Monte Carlos simulations. To calculate the estimated
carbon sequestration over the length of a contract, we multiplied the
mean annual sequestration by contract length and applied a discount for
contracts where “Thinning and partial harvest allowed, not to exceed 5year growth volume” contracts by subtracting the mean annual
sequestration multiplied by 5 years. We calculated total carbon pro
tected (MMT CO2e) by summing the starting carbon storage and the
estimated sequestration over the length of the contract. We calculate a
simple cost per metric ton of carbon dioxide ($ per MT CO2e) by dividing
the total program cost by the total carbon protected.

related goal index for the analysis. The responses were summarized to
a composite climate change index by taking the mean across all 4 items
(α = 0.82) (Table A.5).
We found political tendency was significantly related to the NIPF
owner management goal and attitudinal indices. Specifically, liberal
respondents scored higher on the climate change attitude index (F =
24.9, p < 0.001) and the societal benefit index (F = 5.94, p < 0.001).
Conservative respondents scored higher than liberal counterparts on the
investment goal index (F = 6.14, p < 0.001) and the active forest
management index (F = 16.2, p < 0.001). Conservative and liberal re
spondents did not differ in their scores for home-related goals (p = 0.18)
or the forest protection index (F = 5.75, p = 0.06), nor were differences
in demographic variables among the political tendency of respondents
(age (p = 0.39), education (p = 0.10), income (p = 0.50)). For the full
model analysis, we retained the indices described above and did not
include political tendency.
3.1. Program attribute preference and willingness to participate
Our conditional logit analysis of the BWS data indicated that all of
the program attributes were significant (p < 0.001). Annual payment
was the most preferred attribute followed by cost share. Management
change was the least valued attribute, followed by contract length. At
the level-scale, attributes varied in terms of significance (Table 3). For
the payment related level-scale values (i.e., initial signing payment and
fixed annual payment), coefficients were positive but only coefficients
for the highest payment levels were significant. This indicates that NIPF
owners strongly preferred the higher payment levels compared to the
lowest levels ($20 per acre initial signing payment and $50 per acre
annual payment) but that the mid-levels were not strongly preferred
over the lowest levels. For cost share, both levels of cost share (50% and
75%) had positive and significant coefficients (0.39 and 1.18, respec
tively), indicating that they are preferred over no cost share. For man
agement changes and contract lengths, coefficients were negative and
the only 30-year contract (− 0.91) and most restrictive harvest man
agement (− 0.91) had significant coefficients.
We found that 36% of respondents (n = 180) stated that they would
probably or definitely enroll in at least one of the hypothetical programs
they were shown while 21% of respondents refused (i.e., probably or
definitely would not enroll) all programs that they were offered. Our
final model of willingness to enroll included all program attributes,
program framing, NIPF owners' plans to harvest timber for sale in the
next 10 years, and NIPF owners' scores along the climate change and
protection indices as well as the acres owned (log transformed) and the
mean carbon storage of NIPF ownership (Table 3). The model had an
overall accuracy of 84.6% (95% CI: 0.82, 0.87) and Cohen's κ = 0.75
indicated substantial agreement in classifying NIPF owner responses.
Willingness to enroll in incentive programs was significantly and
positively related to annual payment amount: NIPF owners were 17
times more likely to enroll in and 3 times more likely to consider pro
grams with annual payments of $50 per acre versus programs with $15
per acre (OR: 16.95 and 3.00, Table 3). Inclusion of cost-share payments,
and increased cost-share payments, were also significant predictors of
whether a NIPF owner would enroll vs. not enroll in an incentive pro
gram. Programs that included a 50% or 75% cost share for management
plan preparation and implementation were 2.2 to 2.7 times more likely
to be considered and 4.3 to 5.6 times more likely to be enrolled in,
respectively, as compared to programs that included no cost share
(Table 3). NIPF owners' attitude toward climate change was the third
biggest factor predicting whether a NIPF owner would enroll or not in an
incentive program. A one unit increase in a NIPF owners' climate change
attitude resulted in being 4.2 times more like to enroll in a program (OR:
4.22) and almost 2 times more likely to consider enrolling in a program
(OR: 1.72). Initial signing payments were not significant predictors of
willingness to consider enrolling, however, programs with $20 per acre
initial payments were significantly more likely to be enrolled (2.7 times

3. Results
We received 307 surveys with at least 75% completion (Table A.2).
Of those, 180 respondents completed over half of the BWC scenarios
presented and were complete enough to use for the multinomial logistic
regression. The percent representation of each ecoregion/ownership
size strata in the responses was no different than the percent represen
tation in the sample population (Fisher's exact test, p-value: 1.0,
Table A.2). Respondents who completed the BWC tasks tended to be
younger (H = 27.45, p < 0.001, median age: 65 vs. 73) and more likely
to have a college degree versus the partial respondents (H = 16.4, p <
0.001) (Table 2). In addition, they differed with respect their scores
along the Societal Benefit index. None of the variables that differed
between the partial respondents and those that completed the BWC
section were included in our final model of NIPF owner willingness to
enroll. The survey respondents consisted mostly of males (72.3%) over
the age of 55, and most respondents had obtained bachelor's degrees or
higher and earned above $75 K (Table 2). Respondents' political ten
dency was more commonly conservative leaning than liberal, with
23.7% identifying as moderate. The median forestland ownership size
was 109 acres with most respondents owning between 50 and 500 acres,
which is reflective of the sampling approach.
Most respondents (69.4%) reported more than one forest type on
their forestland. Dominant forest types, which we define as comprising
at least 50% of an ownership, tended to be Douglas fir (59.2% of re
spondents) or mixed conifer/hardwood forests (14.2% of respondents).
Nearly half (45.2%) of respondents reported having harvested timber for
sale in the past 5 years. Similarly, 47.6% of respondents planned to
harvest trees either for sale in the next 10 years (Table 2).
PCA on NIPF owner responses yielded three factors describing land
management goals: amenity-related (6 items), investment-related (3
items), and home-related (3 items) (Table A.3). We retained the
amenity-related goal index (Cronbach's α = 0.72) and the investmentrelated goal index (α = 0.79). NIPF owner attitudes toward forest
management were measured using a five-point agreement scale across 8
items. PCA yielded three indices: active management (3 items, α =
0.71), protection (3 items, α = 0.65), and societal benefit (3 items, α =
0.63) (Table A.4). The active management index was correlated with the
investment-related goal index (r = 0.6); we retained the investment8
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Table 3
Summary of BWC analysis using conditional logit model to assess NIPF owner preferences for program attribute levels and multinomial logistic (MNL) regression to
model NIPF owner willingness to enroll in forest carbon incentive programs. For the MNL, reference response level was set to “No – would not enroll”, predictor
variable reference levels are indicated for categorical variables in the table.

Variable

Intercept
Initial Signing
Payment

No signing paymenta
$10 per acre
$20 per acre
Fixed Annual
$15 per acrea
Payment
$25 per acre
$50 per acre
Cost Share
No cost sharea
50% cost share
75% cost share
Contract Length
10 yearsa
20 years
30 years
Management
Thinning and partial harvest permitted, not to exceed
permitted harvest levelsa
No commercial timber harvest
No timber harvest for duration of contract
Forest Health Framing (versus Forest Carbona)
Plans to Harvest for Sale
Climate Change attitude
Protection Index score
Log(Acres)
Mean Carbon Storage (CO2e/ha)
Number of observations
Akaike Inf. Criterion
McFadden pseudo-R2
Correct classification rate
Cohen's κ

Conditional logit
model

Multinomial logit model

Level-scale analysis

Might enroll

Coefficient (standard
error)

Coefficients (standard
error)

− 0.44
0.09 (0.08)
0.35 (0.09) ***
− 0.69
0.02 (0.09)
0.67 (0.09) ***
− 1.57
0.39 (0.09) ***
1.18 (0.09) ***
0.98
− 0.07 (0.09)
− 0.91 (0.09)***
1.08
− 0.17 (0.09) •
− 0.91 (0.08)***
na
na
na
na
na
na
19,380
4420
na
na
na

likely as compared to no signing payment) (Table 3).
Willingness to enroll or consider enrolling was strongly and nega
tively related to longer contract lengths and more restrictive manage
ment requirements (Table 3). The odds of being willing to enroll or
consider enrolling were 79% and 54% lower for programs with the most
restrictions on management (i.e., “No timber harvest for duration of
contract. Any deadwood removal must be reported.”) as opposed to
programs where thinning and partial harvest were permitted, but not to
exceed the estimated 5-year growth volume for [the NIPF owner's] forest
and as specified by a management plan. Similarly, NIPF owners were
81% less likely to enroll in and 62% less likely to consider programs with
30-year contracts as opposed to those with 10-year contracts.

Would enroll
Odds
ratio

− 0.14 (2.04)

Coefficients (standard
error)

Odds
ratio

− 13.20(4.72) **

0.32 (0.26)
0.46 (0.26)••

1.38
1.58

0.04 (0.44)
1.00 (0.41) *

1.04
2.72

0.64 (0.25) *
1.10 (0.26) ***

1.90
3.00

0.82 (0.46) *
2.83 (0.44) ***

2.27
16.95

0.79 (0.25) **
0.98 (0.26) ***

2.20
2.66

1.46 (0.43) ***
1.72 (0.44) ***

4.31
5.58

− 0.45 (0.25) •
− 0.94 (0.26) ***

0.64
0.39

− 0.70 (0.41) •
− 1.65 (0.45) ***

0.50
0.19

− 0.54 (0.25) *
− 0.78 (0.26) **
− 0.13 (0.44)
− 0.78 (0.51)
0.54 (0.29) •
0.04 (0.43)
− 0.26 (0.28)
− 0.004 (0.002) *
1075
938.7
0.23
84.6%
0.75

0.59
0.46
0.89
0.46
1.72
1.04
0.77
1.00

− 0.98 (0.41) *
− 1.54 (0.42) ***
− 0.16 (0.92)
− 0.96 (1.08)
1.44 (0.64) *
0.74 (0.93)
0.54 (0.58)
− 0.006 (0.003)

0.38
0.21
0.85
0.38
4.22
2.10
1.72
0.99

harvest. Programs that did not allow timber harvest had lower expected
enrollment (9% to 25% of survey respondents) that programs that
allowed for thinning and partial harvest (26% to 42% of survey re
spondents) regardless of contract length (Table 4).
3.3. Landscape simulations of enrollment
Simulation of the hypothetical program enrollment at the landscape
scale resulted in 75,000 to 334,000 acres of forestland enrolled
depending on the program (Table 5). Total carbon protected ranged
from 16.25 MMT CO2e to 50.31 MMT CO2e, with the least attributed to
the No Timber Harvest, 30-year contract program and the most attrib
uted to the Maximum Enrollment, 20-year contract program (Table 5).
Initial carbon storage and annual carbon sequestration scaled directly
with acre enrolled, where the programs with the most acres enrolled also
had the highest estimated initial carbon stores and highest annual car
bon sequestration (Table 5). We found that cost ranged from $3.58 per
MT CO2e to $7.70 per MT CO2e. Our landscape-level outcome results
showed that, for all contract lengths (10-, 20-, 30-years), No Harvest
programs were expected to deliver lower cost ($/MT CO2e) carbon
benefits compared to programs with more flexible management re
quirements (i.e., “Partial harvest and thinning allowed, not to exceed 5year growth volume”) (Table 5).

3.2. Predicting enrollment
Using this model to predict expected enrollment of survey re
spondents, we found that the average proportion of NIPF owners that
would enroll across all possible program combinations (i.e., full factorial
excluding framing, 243 combinations) was less than 10% with 30%
considering enrollment. The program combination with the minimum
expected participation had a predicted enrollment of 2% of NIPF owners
with an additional 10% that would consider enrolling. We chose six
policy-relevant program designs to evaluate landscape outcomes related
to increasing contract length and strict harvest restrictions (i.e., no
timber harvest) versus flexible restrictions (i.e., thinning and partial
harvest allowed, not to exceed estimated 5-year growth volume). To
maximize enrollment, these programs included initial enrollment pay
ments of $20 per acre, annual payments of $50 per acre, and 75% cost
share for management plan preparation and implementation. Maximum
predicted enrollment (40% would enroll; 54% would consider enrolling)
was expected for a 10-year contract that allowed for thinning and partial

4. Discussion and conclusions
We surveyed NIPF owners in western Oregon to determine their
willingness to enroll in practice-based forest carbon incentive programs,
specifically designed to maintain in-forest carbon stocks and seques
tration through limiting timber harvest. Our study offers a timely,
updated assessment of NIPF owner willingness to manage for forest
9
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Table 4
Expected participation (% of survey respondents) for a suite of six forest carbon incentive program designs based on predicted willingness to enroll from multinomial
logistic regression models. To maximize likely enrollment, all programs had the highest levels of payment (initial incentive, annual payment, cost share).
Program name

Program attributes

Contract
length
Maximum Enrollment
Maximum participation with 20-year contract (i.e.,
20yr_Max)
Maximum participation with 30-year contract (i.e.,
30yr_Max)
Maximum participation with most restrictive
management (i.e., NoHarvest_Max)
Maximum participation with most restrictive
management and 20-year contract (i.e.,
NoHarvest20yr_Max)
Maximum participation with most restrictive
management and 30-year contract (i.e.,
NoHarvest30yr_Max)

Expected %
landowner
participation based
on survey
respondents

Management requirements

Payments to
landowner

Would
enroll

Might
enroll

42%

52%

Thinning and partial harvest permitted. Harvest levels can not
exceed the estimated 5-year growth volume for enrolled forest as
specified by management plan.

Initial
Incentive: $20/
acre
Annual
Payment: $50/
acre
75% Cost share

38%

51%

26%

52%

25%

57%

No timber harvest for the duration of the contract.

Initial
Incentive: $20/
acre
Annual
Payment: $50/
acre
75% Cost share

19%

49%

9%

41%

10 years
20 years
30 years
10 years
20 years
30 years

Table 5
Simulated landscape-level outcomes from six hypothetical forest carbon incentive programs. Values presented are the mean (sd) of 500 landscape simulations of
landowner enrollment (i.e, Would Enroll) for each program based on predictions from multinomial logit models using landowner survey data for western Oregon.
Program description

Maximum
enrollment, 10year contract
Maximum
enrollment, 20year contract
Maximum
enrollment, 30year contract
No timber harvest,
10-year contract
No timber harvest,
20-year contract
No timber harvest,
30-year contract

Total acres
enrolled

Starting carbon
storage (MMT
CO2e)

Annual carbon
sequestration (MMT
CO2e yr-1)

Total carbon sequestration over
length of contract (MMT CO2e)

Total C protected
(MMT CO2e, 90% CI)

Total cost
($MM)

$ per MT
CO2e

333,910
(6581)

39.61 (0.90)

1.08 (0.02)

5.62 (0.18)

45.04 (43.46–46.83)

180.6
(3.4)

4.01

300,388
(6074)

35.65 (0.84)

0.97 (0.02)

15.17 (0.51)

50.31 (48.32–52.24)

312.6
(6.4)

6.21

207,744
(4954)

24.67 (0.68)

0.68 (0.02)

17.56 (0.70)

41.57 (39.78–43.30)

320.1
(7.9)

7.70

23.68 (0.78)

0.65 (0.02)

6.78 (0.28)

30.18 (28.63–31.75)

17.51 (0.64)

0.48 (0.01)

10.15 (0.46)

27.11 (25.64–28.79)

8.92 (0.49)

0.24 (0.01)

7.89 (0.55)

16.25 (14.88–17.54)

199,665
(5408)
147,589
(4602)
75,160
(3534)

carbon in temperate forests of the Pacific Northwest. Past studies
focused primarily on willingness to participate in carbon markets or
broader tax incentives and few have been conducted in the last decade
(Charnley et al., 2010; Husa and Kosenius, 2021; Jayasuriya et al., 2020;
Khanal et al., 2017; Li et al., 2021; Markowski-Lindsay et al., 2011;
Miller et al., 2012). In that time, climate change has become more
emphasized in the media (Pearce et al., 2019; Sabherwal et al., 2021),
Americans have increasingly acknowledged the reality of climate
change (Ballew et al., 2019), and climate change impacts are being
recognized in our global and local experiences (Grotta et al., 2013;
Marlon et al., 2019; Pianta and Sisco, 2020). Familiarity and beliefs
about climate change can influence NIPF owners' management decisions
and, thus, our study helps shed light on the current beliefs and will
ingness within this societal context (Lenart and Jones, 2014). In addi
tion, we link empirical data on NIPF owners' willingness to participate in
practice-based incentives with landscape simulations of program carbon
protection outcomes. Decisions by NIPF to enroll or not in a forest car
bon incentive program can have impacts at both the individual and
societal scale, with revenue benefits accruing at individual scale, costs
accruing at the programmatic and societal scales, and carbon and

107.9
(2.6)
153.6
(4.6)
115.8
(5.0)

3.58
5.67
7.13

associated ecosystem co-benefits accruing at larger, societal scales
(Aguilar and Kelly, 2019). Linking projected NIPF owner enrollment
with landscape simulations allows policymakers to assess tradeoffs
among benefits and costs of various hypothetical programs.
Using landscape simulations based on empirical models of NIPF
owner enrollment, we illustrate that carefully designed forest carbon
incentive programs for non-industrial private NIPF owners could have
relatively low cost, tangible carbon mitigation benefits ($3.58 to $7.71
per MT CO2e). Our study predicts that programs which disallow timber
harvest would be expected to enroll between 75,000 and 200,000 acres
of NIPF, while programs with more flexible management requirements
would be likely to enroll 207,000 to 334,000 acres of NIPF. Although
willingness to enroll in the most restrictive (i.e., “no timber harvest”)
programs was lower than willingness to enroll in less restrictive pro
grams, landscape simulations highlighted a tradeoff between increased
enrollment, contract length, management requirements, and costs per
MT CO2e. Specifically, while the total carbon protected was higher for
programs with flexible management requirements (41.57–50.31 MMT
CO2e) than for No Harvest programs (16.25–30.18 MMT CO2e), costs
per MT CO2e were lower for No Harvest programs. These programs
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would provide an average $3900 per year in revenue benefit to indi
vidual NIPF owners and the overall programmatic costs, in terms of
direct payments to NIPF owners, scaled with the area of forest enrolled
and the length of contract. The costs per unit carbon are similar to
current average carbon offset prices, which have not resulted in much
participation in offset programs by NIPF (Wise et al., 2019) and are less
than the $10 - $25 per MT CO2e that has been projected to result in
similar enrollment of private lands (Latta et al., 2016).
We found that more than 1/3 of NIPF owners were willing to enroll
in at least one hypothetical forest carbon incentive program but program
attributes strongly influenced NIPF owner willingness to enroll. Pre
dicted enrollment was highest for programs which paid $50 per acre per
year and included an initial incentive payment of $20 per acre as well as
75% cost share. NIPF owner attitudes toward climate change and their
orientation toward protection of forests and forest-based benefits like
clean air and water were also important drivers in willingness to enroll.
We identify factors that can drive NIPF owner participation in forest
carbon incentive programs, which are broadly consistent with research
on participation by NIPF owners in incentive programs in general
(Daniels et al., 2010; Langpap and Kim, 2010).
Our study is consistent with other literature finding that NIPF
owners' willingness to participate increases with higher monetary in
centives to participate. Higher per acre annual payments significantly
increased the probability of enrollment. We found that initial signing
incentives (e.g., one-time initial payment in addition to annual pay
ments) did not significantly increase likelihood of enrollment until
above $10 per acres. This result indicates that NIPF owners may
perceive $10 per acre initial signing payments similarly to no signing
payments and suggests a threshold for increasing NIPF owner partici
pation. Other studies have found one-time up-front payments were more
effective in increasing initial participation than annual payments for
contracts of over 5 years (Mitani and Lindhjem, 2021). The incentive
amounts offered in our study are within the range explored by other
research on NIPF owners willingness to participate in forest manage
ment incentive programs and carbon market programs, which vary
substantially across studies and can range from $3 per acre (Miller et al.,
2012) to $1000 per acre (Kline et al., 2000; Markowski-Lindsay et al.,
2011). Most commonly, studies include annual payment ranges of $5 to
$80 per acre (Alhassan et al., 2019; Dickinson et al., 2012; Fletcher
et al., 2009; Kang et al., 2018; Kelly et al., 2016; Shaikh et al., 2007;
Smith et al., 2017; Soto et al., 2016; White et al., 2018).
Despite the clear relationship between increased financial incentives
and increased participation by NIPF owners, we found that a proportion
of NIPF owners are likely to participate at low financial incentive levels.
In general, NIPF owners who tend to be more oriented toward protecting
nature, protecting forests for future generations, and valuing nonmarket benefits from forests (i.e., clean air and water) would be more
likely to enroll or consider enrolling at lower incentive levels. Other
studies of NIPF willingness to engage in forest carbon management have
found similar relationships between lower incentive requirements for
amenity-owners (Khanal et al., 2017) and suggest that the management
changes often promoted in forest carbon programs are well matched
with NIPF for whom financial gain is not the primary ownership
objective (Miller et al., 2012).
Our study confirmed the importance of including a cost share in
incentive programs targeted to NIPF owners (Andrejczyk et al., 2016a;
Kilgore et al., 2007). In addition to cost share for management plans,
respondents in our survey frequently referenced the need and desire for
one-on-one technical assistance from an extension or consulting forester.
While our study did not specifically address NIPF owner desire for
technical assistance, these observations support conclusions made by
others that sustainable forestry initiatives can be more successful by
funding opportunities for onsite consultation and other forms of NIPF
owner assistance (Kilgore et al., 2015; Kilgore et al., 2007). Onsite
consultation (i.e., “walking the land”) with a forester can build NIPF
owners' understanding of incentive program goals and increase the

likelihood that NIPF owners enroll and follow management objectives
within the incentive programs (Andrejczyk et al., 2016b; Daniels et al.,
2010).
NIPF owners can play a significant role in climate mitigation through
actions on their forest lands, but less is known about how NIPF owners
perceptions of climate change impact their participation in forest man
agement to maintain carbon storage and increase carbon sequestration
(Charnley et al., 2010). Climate skepticism, along with a perception of
climate change as highly politicized, is common among NIPF owners in
the Pacific Northwest (Grotta et al., 2013). Skepticism toward and po
litical polarization surrounding climate change and carbon sequestra
tion could be barriers to successful implementation of policies and
programs related to climate change mitigation and adaptation (Fischer
and Charnley, 2011; Khanal et al., 2016). However, we found that
framing an incentive program as either a “forest carbon” or a “forest
health” had no impact on NIPF owners' willingness to enroll. Instead,
NIPF owners' attitudes toward climate change, as measured by their
beliefs that climate change will impact their forest, that human activities
are contributing to climate change, that forest can help reduce climate
change impacts, and that humans have responsibility to alleviate climate
change impacts, were a very strong predictor of their willingness to
enroll in forest carbon incentive programs regardless of program
framing. The lack of importance of “forest carbon” versus “forest health”
framing might be explained by the fact that most NIPF owners believed
that forests can help reduce climate change impacts and thus, could view
forest health and forest carbon as synonymous. While NIPF owners
might not perceive the framing of the policy as important, forest man
agement actions included in the programs (i.e., reducing timber harvest)
might still be rejected by NIPF owners if they associate them with a
political or climate change belief system oppositional to their own
(Grotta et al., 2013).
The demographic profile of our survey respondents (i.e., mostly
males over 55 years old) was similar to NIPF owners in the western US
(Butler et al., 2016). However, more respondents had obtained bache
lor's degrees or higher, earned above $75 K, and had slightly longer
tenure (32.9 yrs). In addition, NIPF owners in our study tended to be
“engaged” forest owners, with many having existing forest management
plans (31.1%) and more harvesting timber for sale in the past (45%)
than NIPF owners of more than 100 acres in the U.S. Pacific Coast region
more generally (29%, Butler et al., 2016). Size of forest holdings is a
common predictor variable in many models of landowner behavior
(Silver et al., 2015) and is a strong predictor of numerous attributes of
NIPF (Butler et al., 2016). However, in our study, forest ownership size
was not a strong predictor of NIPF owner willingness to enroll in forest
carbon incentive programs. We found that NIPF owners with plans to
harvest timber in the next 10 years were less likely to enroll or consider
enrolling in the forest carbon incentive programs. These owners may
have short- to mid-term financial goals that conflict with participation in
a program that limits timber harvest (Langpap, 2006) or may require
higher rates of compensation to defer timber harvesting (Kline et al.,
2000).
We found that NIPF owner participation, measured by the proportion
of NIPF owners who would enroll, varied depending on program attri
butes but ranged from 2% to 40% which is within the range of estimates
from other studies. White et al. (2018) found that 14 to 60% of NIPF
owners would participate in a carbon market program, depending on
program characteristics. Khanal et al. (2017) showed the importance of
revenue to NIPF owners in the southern United States, where they found
that carbon market scenarios that led to revenue-neutral or loss of rev
enue resulted in 25% and 16% participation as opposed to revenuepositive scenarios which led to participation by over half the NIPF
owners. This study, and others focused on forest carbon markets, found
lower expected participation by NIPF owners in forest management
programs targeting carbon (i.e., climate mitigation) outcomes then ex
pected NIPF owner participation in incentive programs aimed at a range
of conservation outcomes (average 48% predicted participation across a
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meta-analysis of discrete choice studies) (Mitani and Lindhjem, 2021).
We used survey methods to elicit NIPF owners' willingness to
participate in hypothetical programs and add to body of literature aimed
at evaluating NIPF owners' participation in incentive programs (Lang
pap, 2006; Langpap and Kim, 2010). Survey methods, which measure
stated intent or hypothetical participation, are consistent with majority
of recent literature (Husa and Kosenius, 2021; Mitani and Lindhjem,
2021). It is important to note that average participation in incentive
programs by NIPF owners is significantly lower when estimated from
observed actions (e.g., actual participation) (Mitani and Lindhjem,
2021), consistent with research suggesting that behavior can deviate
from individuals' stated intent (Champ et al., 1997). Thus, our study
provides a hypothetical benchmark for comparing and designing
incentive programs; realized incentive programs should be monitored
and evaluated based on the NIPF behaviors (i.e., actual enrollments and
observed management change).
Practice-based incentive programs could increase participation by
NIPF owners in forest management with carbon storage and sequestra
tion goals by lowering the requirements as compared to carbon offset
markets. Forest carbon offsets are subject to stringent requirements and
reporting designed to assure that offsets be “real, additional, quantifi
able, permanent, verifiable, and enforceable” (California Air Resources
Board (CARB), 2011). The implementation of these requirements creates
barriers to participation by smaller NIPF owners (Kerchner and Keeton,
2015; Wise et al., 2019). However, incentive programs for carbon
storage and sequestration face challenges in quantifying benefits,
demonstrating additional sequestration, and ensuring economic effi
ciency (Patterson and Coelho, 2009; Wise et al., 2019). One proffered
solution is to develop forest carbon incentive programs which accept
some amount of risk with respect to non-additionality and nonpermanence, while still motivating participation that results in
measurable changes to business-as-usual management (Gren and Zeleke,
2016). In our study, we assume that many NIPF owners in western
Oregon plan to harvest in the short- to mid-term future and that
enrollment in an incentive program that limits timber harvest would
result in measurable carbon storage and sequestration benefit despite
the risk of some non-additionality and non-permanence. This assump
tion is consistent with empirical observations from this survey that
~60% of NIPF owners plan to harvest trees for sale or personal use in the
next 10 years. We show a tradeoff between contract length, expected
enrollment, and total carbon protected over the term of a contract.
Shifting toward contracts longer than 10 years, while decreasing overall
enrollment, could lead to longer-lasting carbon benefits consistent with
greenhouse gas reduction goals from natural and working lands at state
and global levels (McDonald et al., 2021; United Nations, 2015).
Practice-based forest carbon incentive programs provide a voluntary
mechanism to encourage NIPF owners to adopt forest management to
maintain carbon stocks and increase carbon sequestration. Forests can
serve as one in a toolbox of strategies, alongside transitioning away from
fossil fuels across sectors, to address the urgent need to reduce atmo
spheric emissions. However, to realize the potential benefit from addi
tional carbon storage and sequestration in forests, forest carbon
management activities need to be implemented in the near term (Gris
com et al., 2017). Our study provides insight into how policymakers
might design programs to facilitate forest-based natural climate solu
tions among NIPF owners and includes the ability for evaluating
tradeoffs among program designs that maximize potential participation
and those that may lead to more durable climate mitigation over the
next decades. We hope the results of this research will help inform the
design of potential forest carbon incentive programs and discussion
about the role of NIPF in forest carbon management for climate miti
gation in the PNW and elsewhere.
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